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Abstract
In this paper we try to assess the nature, size and consistency of recent economic growth in
Mozambique. We attempt to verify whether and to what extent this growth is unprecedented as has
been claimed. We look at the available data to assess whether this growth is even across sectors and
GDP components. Finally we try to assess whether by any indication we can say if observed growth
is balanced and, if not, to what extent economic policy is actually responsible. We argue that
economic growth in Mozambique still appears to be out of balance, weak, uneven, and
unsustainable, calling for a re-orientation of economic policy able to guarantee a more balanced and
even growth across the economy. We also argue that, as a stable and steady economic growth is not
warranted, Government action should be inspired to broaden its sets of instruments and goals, and
that international agencies and donors should help it adopt the consequent policies. The spiral of
debt, aid and conditionality certainly cripples Mozambique’s Government autonomy, but it is only
by broadening its sets of instruments and goal that Mozambique’s economy will embark on a
sustainable growth path.
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2Introduction
Recently several commentators and policy observers have pointed out the unprecedented
rates of economic growth in Mozambique. According to the World Bank country web-page
presentation, “with 12.4 percent GDP growth in 1997, Mozambique is the fastest growing nation on
the African continent”. Mozambique is one of the 25 fastest-growing countries recorded by the
World Bank (1997) for the 1900-1995 period. The World Bank “Mozambique at a Glance” table
reports for 1998 GDP a 12% growth rate. The most recent IMF Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for
Mozambique states that “during 1996-98, the economy grew at an annual average rate of 10
percent”.1 In this paper we will try to assess the nature, size and consistency of recent economic
growth in Mozambique. We will attempt to verify whether and to what extent this growth is
unprecedented as has been claimed. We will then look at the available data to assess whether this
growth is even across sectors and GDP components. Finally we will try to assess whether by any
indication we can say if observed growth is balanced and, if not, to what extent economic policy is
actually responsible.
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has suffered from what Easterly and Levine (1997) have called
the “growth tragedy”, and Mozambique has certainly not been exempted. Floods, droughts, colonial
rule followed by a “civil war” between a guerrilla movement—armed by Rhodesia first and then by
South Africa—and a centrally-planned socialist economy, certainly contributed to this tragedy.
Against this background, recent enthusiasm for the observed growth rates is understandable. And
yet, has Mozambique really stepped onto a durable growth path or will the foundations for
Mozambique’s hopes prove too fragile?
In this paper we try to assess whether observed growth in Mozambique really is
unprecedented. We will show that the current growth rates have already been experienced in the last
forty years and that the current levels of national product are just about the same as those attained in
the last years of colonial rule. Moreover, in a regional comparison, we show that there is little
reason to consider Mozambique as different from most of its neighbors, with whom it appears to
share the regional slumps and the booms of economic performance. Thus, not only has
Mozambique’s growth been observed before, but according to most international standards,
Mozambique still looks like one of the poorest and most lagging countries in the world.
Yet, if there are reasons to cheer, as growth is certainly tangible and noteworthy, there are
also reasons to worry about its solidity and sustainability. In several respects, in fact, growth looks
uneven and unbalanced. By looking at output, we are able to show that growth across sectors has
been profoundly uneven over the years, at least since independence. This has had deep implications
in social terms, as a large share of the population in Mozambique still depends on agriculture. On
the demand side, by looking at consumption patterns and income distribution, we show that
economic growth has been even more uneven, penalizing large shares of the population. It appears
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3that a very tiny minority has benefited from the higher living standards brought about by increased
levels of income. Moreover, poverty still looms as a national tragedy of stunning proportions in
international terms.
We then ask whether growth in Mozambique is somehow balanced, as only balanced
growth can ultimately be sustainable. With the data available, it appears the capital accumulation
has been very sluggish. The physical capital stock has grown unevenly, thanks to a skewed
industrial policy and mixed results from privatization and liberalization. Investment still looks
depressed, particularly in the agricultural sector, and its productivity low. Human and social capital
have been depleted over the last fifteen years. Illiteracy rates have risen again, after the good first
years of independence. Education—especially secondary and higher education—seems to be a
luxury that few people can afford and even fewer think is worth investing in. Health and public
goods are also largely underfunded. In short, all capital accumulation indicators show that growth
has been largely unbalanced.
Finally, we look at the role of Government and economic policy. The State in Mozambique
still looks too “big” and Mozambican Government still does “too much”. True, among “non
market” failures (i.e. Government failures), type-1 failures—what the Government does and should
not—are apparent. The State budget is still large, trade and market liberalization have been slow,
and privatization has produced mixed results. However, type-2 failures—what the Government
should do and does not—are no less grave. This is particularly true for the provision of public
goods, like health and education. Now, while type-1 failures call for a reduction of Government’s
role (through privatization and liberalization policies), type-2 failures call for a more effective
Government action. International agencies and donors always put the blame on the first type, often
forgetting that the lack of Government intervention to avoid the second type of failures is as
important for sustained growth as privatization and liberalization.
In conclusion, economic growth in Mozambique still appears to be out of balance, besides
being weak and uneven, and no one is blameless. The Government of Mozambique certainly bears
some responsibility. A frequent excuse is that the Government (like others in Africa) has little room
for maneuvering and making mistakes, constrained as it is by an ever-mounting debt and an ever-
increasing need for aid. However, we show that the amount of aid that Mozambique has received in
almost twenty years would have been enough to cover its net resource deficit, provided the State
had been able to take care of its own expenses. The State has been systematically spending too
much or collecting too little. But too little has been spent on education, health, infrastructure and
general welfare. Aid has been wrongly targeted, and type-2 Government failures have grown larger
amidst efforts to reduce the role of the State.
This study argues that economic growth in Mozambique is still weak and unsustainable
and that economic policy must be reoriented to guarantee a more balanced and even growth across
the economy. In line with Joseph Stiglitz’s (1998) criticism of the so-called Washington consensus
policies, we argue that, as stable and steady economic growth is not warranted, Government action
4should be inspired to broaden its sets of instruments and goals, and that international agencies and
donors should help it adopt the consequent policies. The devilish spiral of debt, aid and
conditionality certainly cripples Mozambique’s Government autonomy, but it is only by broadening
its sets of instruments and goal that Mozambique’s economy will embark on a sustainable growth
path. The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we discuss whether current growth is
unprecedented. In the second section, we discuss whether current observed growth is even, while in
the third section we discuss whether growth is balanced. The following section discusses the role of
Government, while the last brief section concludes the paper with a few remarks.
1. Unprecedented growth?
Although several sources have pointed out the recent unp dented growth of
Mozambican economy, there is no consensus on the actual evaluation of such growth. The IMF’s
PFP for 1999-2002 (IMF (1999)) states that “during 1996-98, the economy grew at an annual
average rate of 10 percent”. The PFP reports an annual change in real Gross Dom stic Product
(GDP) of 11.3% for 1997 and 12% for 1998. In its 1999-2002 economic plan, the Government of
Mozambique (GM) reports a real GDP growth rate of 11% for 1997 and 9.9% for 1998
(Government of Mozambique (1999)). The “economic overview” of the privatization program in
Mozambique, presented by UTRE (the privatization unit of the Mozambican Ministry of Planning
and Finance), states that “under PRES [Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program], and
following the return to peace in 1992, Mozambique has experienced one of the highest average
growth rates of any sub-Saharan African country” with an average annual growth rate of 8% from
1993 to 1997. “Actual growth in 1997 was 6.6% against a forecast 5.6%” (UTRE (1999)).
The World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI 1998) provides several interesting
figures in this regard. In the “Country at a Glance” table, a 12.4 annual percentage rate for real GDP
growth is reported for 1997. In the same report, the average annual percentage growth rate of GNP
for 1996-1997 is said to be 13.3. African Development Indicators (ADI 1999), a joint publication of
the World Bank and UNDP, reports a real GDP growth rate of 11.3% for 1997 and 11.8% for 1998.
Finally, the World Bank 1999 World Development Report (WDR 1999) shows an average annual
growth rate for total GNP of 11.3% for 1997-98. All these figures are presented in Table 1.
Figures for Gross National Product (GNP) are no less diverse. Total GNP for Mozambique
for 1997, calculated using the Atlas method (WDI 1998), was 2,4 billions US dollars (ranking
122).2 Conversely, ADI 1999 reports a value for total GNP in millions US dollars of 3,256.5 in
1997 and 3,731.1 in 1998, and a value of 3,121 for real GDP in 1997. WDR 1999 (Table 1) reports
a value for total GNP in 1998 of 3.6 billions of US dollars. The GM’s economic plan reports a value
of total GDP in millions of US dollars equal to 3,521 in 1997 and 3,674 in 1998 (GM (1999)), but
no value for GNP. Finally, the IMF’s PFP reports a value for nominal GNP in millions of US
dollars of 3,438 for 1997 and 3,893 for 1998. All these differences are summarized in Table 1.
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5Table 1. Mozambique GNP and GDP figures according to various sources
GNP GDP
Real
(growth rate)
Nominal
(millions US
dollars)
Real
(growth rate)
Nominal
(millions US
dollars)
Sources 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998
IMF PFP 3438.0 3893.0 11.3 12.0
Government of Mozambique (GM) 11.0 9.9 3521.0 3674.0
WDI 13.3 2405.0 12.4
ADI 3256.5 3731.1 11.3 11.8 3121.0
WDR 11.3 3256.5 3600.0 3959.0
Per capita figures also are no less different according to the source. The IMF’s PFP reports
a value for real per capita GDP of 207 US$ for 1997, while the GM’s economic plan reports values
(in US dollars )of 179.3 for 1996, 212.9 for 1997, and 217.2 for 1998. The WDI 1998 Atlas GNP
ranking puts Mozambique in the 207th place (third to last), with 140 US dollars per capita in 1997,
and in the 205th place with 690 “international dollars” (purchasing power adjusted) per capita. ADI
1999 reports for Mozambique a per capita GNP value of 90 dollars (Basic Indicator table 1.1) in
1997, and values of 160 (for 1996), 180 (for 1997), and 210 US dollars (for 1998) from the Africa
Live Database Country Outline Table (ALD 1999). The same source reports per capita values of
GDP for 1996, 1997, and 1998 of, respectively, 175.1, 206.7, and 233.6 US dollars. Finally, WDR
1998 (Table 1) shows a value for GNP per capita for 1998 of 210 US dollars, and an average
growth rate for 1997-98 of 9.2%. GNP measured at PPP for 1998 is reported being equal to 850
international dollars.
Over a longer span, WDI 1998 reports an average real GDP growth rate of 4.9% for the
period 1990-1997 and of -0.1% for the period 1980-1990. ADI 1999 reports an average real GDP
growth rate of 4.2% over the 1990-1997 period, and an average GNP per capita growth rate of 2.2%
over the period 1987-1997 (although this ones shows a considerable variability over the years). The
Statistical Yearbook of the Mozambican National Institute of Statistics (INE) reports values (in
billions of US dollars) of 1,36 in 1987 and 1,74 in 1996, which amounts to an average growth rate
of 2.5% per year (INE (1996)). However, in this case also there seems to have been a lot of
variability.
If we take a longer perspective, we get a more thorough and interesting picture. However, a
caveat is in order at this point. It must be stressed that to get a broader point of view, long time
series are not easily available in the case of Mozambique. The most importance sources mentioned
above often fail to offer long time series (longer than a ten-year span) in a systematic way. Long
time series in real terms (constant prices) are usually provided neither by the World Bank, nor by
the IMF. No official publication from Mozambique (whether from the Government, the Ministry of
Finance, UTRE or INE) provides any national account data in real terms. The task of digging
through different sources, cutting and pasting compatible series thus remains to be done. In order to
obtain a reliable and self-coherent, consistent long time series of Mozambique GDP in real terms,
we have thus combined the recently created GDP in constant 1987 prices series (Nehru, Swanson
6and Dubey (1999)), which goes up to 1992, with the GDP in constant 1987 prices series provided
by the ADI publication (ADI 1999), which goes from 1988 to 1997. The real GDP series is show in
Figure 1, while its growth rate is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Mozambique Real GDP at constant 1987 prices (billion Mts)
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Figure 2. Mozambique real GDP growth rate (percent)
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There are several points deserving attention. In the first place, it is true that Mozambique
has recently witnessed an unprecedented conomic growth, although only in relative terms. Growth
rates have been greater than 10% for the first time since independence, as Figure 2 shows. But
growth rates were already two-digits numbers in 1968 an 1969. In the second place, if we look at
the levels of real GDP, it is true that they recently reached unprecedented values. And yet, it is also
true that the upward trend before independence had long been interrupted. It has taken Mozambique
24 years to produce a level of GDP higher than the one last obtained in 1973. In the third place, it is
the starting point of this upward trend that was very low. The Mozambican economy has undergone
big changes since 1975. Prior to independence, the bulk of the Mozambican managerial and
industrialist labor force were of Portuguese origin or descent. Independence was reached by war,
and after the war the bulk of the qualified labor force engaged in productive activities quit the
country, leaving Mozambique orphaned of its managers and industrialists. However, the country
quickly picked up. From 1976 to 1981 the economy steadily grew, despite the new “African
socialist model” and warring and troubled neighbors (Fi ure 2). The following years were
7complicated by floods, droughts and a beginning internal guerrilla movement, thus bringing the
country back to backwardness.3 It was only in 1987 was there an upturn that lasted until the end of
the internal war in 1992.4 Then, 1993 was a negative year with 1994 seeing a return to positive
growth rates. In summary, the upward trend in growth rates really started right after independence
and in spite of the war positive growth has been maintained ever since. Thus, we can say that
Mozambique is basically “back on track” that was set sometime ago. Its economy is producing
some good results although quite belatedly and after some serious corrections.
How much of this unprecedented growth pertains to Mozambique and how much is it
shared by its neighbors, that is, is a regional phenomenon? The picture provided by the World
Bank’s African Development Indicators shows that in 1997 the whole Sub-Saharan Africa
excluding South Africa (SSASA), had a GNP per capita of 308 US dollars, while Mozambique had
a value of only 90 US dollars.5 Yet, the average growth rate for the 1987-97 period for SSASA was
a dismaying –0.5%, while for Mozambique its was 2.2%. Table  shows a ranking of Southern
African countries by per capita GNP levels and growth rates. As one can see, Mozambique runs
quite unhappily in the last position, with a per capita GNP in 1997 that is less than 1/2 that of
Tanzania (its northern neighbor), almost 1/4 that of Angola, less than 1/8 that of Zimbabwe, and 38
times lower than that of South Africa. Therefore, Mozambique’s very recent performance appears
to be quite remarkable when compared with the other Southern African neighbors, if we exclude
Botswana (Table 2).
Table 2. Southern African Countries by GNP per capita and Total Real GDP growth rate
GNP Per capita Total Real GDP
Atlas dollars
1997
Growth rate (%)
Countries ranked by GNP
values in 1997
(in parenthesis: rank by GNP
per capita growth rate) (ADI) (WDI)
1998
(WDR)
Growth
rate (%)
1987-97 1975-84 1985-89 1990-97
1. South Africa  (9) 3400 3210 2880 –0.4 2.6 1.6 1.2
2. Botswana  (1) 3260 3310 3600 4.4 11.4 10.3 4.7
3. Namibia  (4) 2200 2110 1940 1.6 – 2.2 3.5
4. Swaziland  (3) 1440 n.a. n.a. 1.9 3.3 9.9 3.2
5. Zimbabwe  (8) 750 720 610 0.0 3.0 4.2 2.1
6. Lesotho  (5) 670 680 570 1.0 4.5 7.8 7.0
7. Zambia (10) 380 370 330 –2.3 0.2 2.3 –0.4
8. Angola (11) 340 260 340 –13.1 – 4.7 –1.6
9. Malawi  (6) 220 210 200 0.5 3.2 1.9 3.5
10. Tanzania  (7) 210 210 210 0.1 – – 2.8
11. Mozambique  (2) 90 207 210 2.2 –1.5 6.0 4.2
Source. If not otherwise indicated, ADI Basic Indicators Table 1.1, Gross Domestic Product Table 2.1 (ADI 1999) and
our calculations
However, a look at the noticeable performance of Mozambique’s GDP shows that the
recent growth rates enjoyed by the Mozambican economy are not “unprecedented”, at least in
                                                 
3 Interestingly, real GDP in 1986 almost equaled the 1966 value.
4 For partial recounts of the independence years, see for instance Hanlon (1986), de Almeida Serra (1991), Kyle (1994),
Tibana (1994).
5 Evaluated according to the Atlas method (ADI 1999).
8regional terms. Over the 1990-1997 period, eight out of eleven countries in the area had a growth
rate higher than 2% per year. Also, over the 1985-1989 period, Mozambique’s real GDP grew at an
average rate of 6% per year: as well as for most countries, growth rates in that five-year period were
mostly higher than during the nineties (exceptions were Malawi and Namibia). Hence, at least from
a regional perspective, Mozambique’s recent economic performance seems in line with a more
general positive growth trend.
Table 3. GDP and Population of Southern African Countries in 1997
Total real GDP
(US dollars)
Share of total GDP
over total Southern
Africa (%)
Population
(millions)
Share of population
over total Southern
Africa (%)
South Africa 116730 74.9 38.3 28.0
Botswana 5690 3.7 1.5 1.1
Namibia 3108 2.0 1.6 1.2
Zimbabwe 5908 3.8 11.5 8.4
Lesotho 792 0.5 2.1 1.5
Zambia 3352 2.2 9.4 6.9
Angola 6648 4.3 11.4 8.3
Malawi 1643 1.1 10.3 7.5
Tanzania 7917 5.1 31.3 22.9
 Mozambique 3959 2.5 18.5 13.5
Total Southern Africa !Invalid Character
Setting
100.0 136.9 100.0
Source: WDR 1999, ADI 1999)
Therefore, while it is true that Mozambique has improved, the road ahead still looks long
and difficult. When we speak of unprecedented growth, e should keep in mind that the speed of
economic growth (the growth rate) is important but so is the level of growth. Thus, if we look at the
level of GNP per capita in Mozambique in 1997 (although figures are not quite consistent, see
Table 2) it is clear that the country is far behind most of its neighbors (although distances had to be
much greater in 1987 than they are now). Suppose, as an exercise, that Mozambique will enjoy that
same 2.2% annual growth rate it had over the period 1987-97 for the next years ahead. Starting
from a level of 210 US dollars it would take Mozambique 30 years to get to a per capita GNP of
400 US dollars. With a 10% annual growth rate, it would take Mozambique 15 years to reach
Zimbabwe current per capita level of 750 dollars. The Mozambican population-o e seven h of the
whole 137 million people that live in Southern Africa-enjoys only 1/25 of total GDP produced in
the area (Table 3). Only Tanzanian’s condition is worse with one fourth of total population
producing less than a twenty-fifth of total GNP: Mozambique is still a long way from real and
sustained economic growth.
The burden of history is difficult to shed. Mozambique has done much to overcome its
economic heritage of colonial rule and the scars of its more recent past. And yet it seems that the
meager bequest received-including the poor infrastructure, the almost non-existing human capital, a
destroyed industrial structure-s ill lingers on its economic performance. Mozambique was one of
9the last country in Africa to obtain independence from colonial rule in 1975. And the Portuguese
colonial domination was certainly one of the most backward, both in pure economic terms, and in
political and institutional ones. In the aftermath of liberation Mozambique was left in terrible
conditions-limiting our considerations to the economic heritage of colonial rule, from a mere
macroeconomic point of view. In 1950, Portugal was still a poor country, with a real per capita
GDP that in US dollar terms was only 13.5% of American GDP.6. In 1960, Portugal’s per capita
GDP had increased (in relative terms) to 18.7% of the American one. Interestingly, Mozambique’s
per capita GDP in 1960 was equal to 1145 US dollars (in 1985 prices), almost two thirds of the
Portuguese one. Of Mozambique’s Southern African neighbors, only South Africa and Namibia
enjoyed a higher per capita GDP in 1960. Fifteen years later, in 1975, Mozambique conditions were
no better. Portugal left a country with a GDP of 1184 US dollars per capita (in 1985 prices). That is,
more than three and a half times smaller than the Portuguese one, whereas all of its Southern
African neighbors, excluding Angola, Portugal’s other colony, had improved (see Table 4)7. The
relative economic decline then continued, and per capita GDP in Mozambique has continuously
decreased ever since, both in absolute terms (until 1990) and in relative terms vis-à-vis its
neighbors.
Table 4. Real GDP per capita in 1985 constant prices
GDP
in US
$
%
relative
to
US
%
relative
to
Mozam
bique
GDP
in US
$
%
relative
to
US
%
relative
to
Mozam
bique
GDP
in US
$
%
relative
to
US
%
relative
to
Mozam
bique
GDP
in US
$
%
relative
to
US
%
relative
to
Mozam
bique
%
relative
to
Mozam
bique
1960 1975 1980 1990 1997
USA 9908 100 865.313712 100 1158.15311 100 1662.418073 100 2378.0
South Africa 2185 22.1 190.8 3579 26.1 302.33496 22.8 379.6 3250 18.0 427.61472.3
Portugal 1857 18.7 162.2 4320 31.5 364.94982 32.5 540.9 7487 41.4 985.1
Namibia 1761 17.8 153.8 3589 26.2 303.12900 18.9 314.9 2852 15.8 375.31024.9
Zimbabwe 998 10.1 87.2 1355 9.9 114.41207 7.9 131.1 1181 6.5 155.4 488.6
Zambia 946 9.5 82.6 1251 9.1 105.7 969 6.3 105.2 688 3.8 90.5 150.7
Swaziland 1240 12.5 108.3 2556 18.6 215.93041 19.9 330.2 4655 25.8 612.5 561.3
Mozambique1145 11.6 100.0 1184 8.6 100.0 921 6.0 100.0 760 4.2 100.0 100.0
Angola 928 9.4 81.0 733 5.3 61.9 675 4.4 73.3 400.8
Botswana 525 5.3 45.9 1326 9.7 112.01929 12.6 209.4 1264.7
Tanzania 315 3.2 27.5 509 3.7 43.0 480 3.1 52.1 746 4.1 98.2 89.5
Lesotho 312 3.1 27.2 765 5.6 64.6 991 6.5 107.6 968 5.4 127.4 228.3
Malawi 380 3.8 33.2 509 3.7 43.0 554 3.6 60.2 519 2.9 68.3 98.3
Source: Penn World Tables, our calculations. For 1997, source: ADI, our calculations.
Mozambique has still to overcome big hurdles lingering from its past, including a long
dispossessing colonial rule, a State run economy under a socialist regime that has become
increasingly inefficient and inept and a savage internal war (initially foddered by the South African
                                                 
6 See the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston (1991)). To give an idea, South Africa real per capita GDP in 1950
was equal to 2185 US dollars (in 1985 prices), i.e. 22.3% of the American one.
7 In other words, from 1960 to 1975 (when it had to leave Africa), Portugal had gotten richer whereas its Southern
African colonies had gotten poorer.
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apartheid regime). In conclusion, economic growth in Mozambique is on its way, but it still suffers
from a series of negative factors whose lasting influence is difficult to eliminate. Today dim lights
are not yet the stars that some Agencies would like to spot and put on the cover page as their
success stories.
2. Even growth?
The data on the evolution of the structure of output, as well as on the evolution of the
structure of demand, also show an interesting picture. They can reveal how even economic growth
has really been over the years in Mozambique. Data on the structure of output and composition of
demand are, once again, often missing, incomplete or incoherent. According to the WDI tables, the
annual growth rate of real GDP has been equal to –0.1% over the 1980-90 period and to 4.9% over
the 1990-1997 period, while according to the latest figures from the WDR tables, real GDP has
grown at an annual 5.7% rate over the 1900-98 period.
Agricultural output has grown, in the two periods (1980-90 and 1990-97), at a 2.1% and
6.1% rate, respectively (WDI, 1998). Conversely, industrial output has decreased during the
eighties at a –8.3% rate per year, while it has increased at a 9.1% annual rate in the second period.
As a consequence, the output of the service sector increased by 19.5% per year in the first period
and only by 2.2% per year in the second period.8 If we look at the composition of GDP we can see
that from 1980 to 1998 the contribution of the agricultural sector has gone from 48 to 34 percent of
GDP, that of the industrial sectors has gone from 30 to 18 percent of GDP, whereas the share of the
service sector has increased from 27 to 45 percent of GDP (Figure 3).
Mozambique is mostly an agricultural country, with vast natural resources and plenty of
arable land. However, although exploitation of the overseas provinces for the production of staples
was an objective of Portuguese colonial policy, this policy was never successful.9 In 1963, for
instance, only 25% of Mozambique gross domestic product came from agriculture, while two thirds
of GDP were from the service sector (DNE 1985). Interestingly, at that time, Mozambican product
almost equaled a third of Portuguese GDP. In 1970, agricultural output in Mozambique rose to 30%
of total GDP, while in 1975 it took up more than 36%. In 1980, agricultural output amounted to
37% of total GDP, in 1985 it had risen to more than 54%, in 1990 it was back to less than 40%
(DNE 1994), while in 1995 it was no more then 32.7% (ADI 1999). The data we have on land use
show that the percentage of land under permanent crop has always been a very tiny portion of total
land area (it was 0.3% in 1980 and it still was in 1996). The percentage of irrigated land over total
cropland has gone in fifteen years (from 1979-81 to 1994-96) from 2.1 to 3.4. The number of actual
hectares of arable land per capita has decreased in the same fifteen years, going from 0.24 in 1979-
81 to 0.19 in 1994-96.
                                                 
8 Value added for the three sectors shows similar behavior. Agricultural value added has grown at a 6.6% rate during
1980-90 and at a 4.8% rate during 1990-98. Industrial value added has changed with annual growth rates of –4.5% and
8.5%, respectively, in the two periods. Service value added has increased by an annual 8.1% rate in the first period and
5.1% rate in the second period.
9 See e.g. Vail and White (1980), Newitt (1981), Pitcher (1995), and Isaacman and Chilundo (1995).
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Figure 3. Sector shares of GDP in selected years
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Figure 4. Sectoral growth rates and GDP growth rate in the nineties
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Clearly, the nature of agriculture production has changed over the years, although the great
bulk of the Mozambican labor force over the long run has remained in agriculture (WDI 1998).
Industrial production and services have also changed over the decades. In 1965, for instance,
Mozambique exports amounted to 1.3 billion escudos (4.5% of GDP), of which 18% was cotton,
16% was cashew nuts, and 10% was sugar. In 1975, 8% of total exports was cotton, 15% was
cashew and 11.3% was sugar. In 1995, 20% of total exports came from cashew nuts, 5.6% came
from cotton, 5.7% came from sugar. The largely unproductive agriculture of the big plantations in
the northern part of the country gave way first to the cooperatives and collective farms of the
socialist era, and gradually to an increasing number of small farms and wage-labor farms in the
recent years.
In almost 20 years, the crop production index (as measured from 3-year averages with base
1989-91=100) has gone from 109.4 back in 1979-81 to 126.1 in 1995-97 (WDI 1998). That is,
during the eighties there has been no improvement in crop production (actually a worsening), and
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only during the nineties has it gone up by more than a quarter. While the food production index has
been stagnant for a decade (it was 99.2 in 1979-81) and has increased up to 119.5 in 1995-97, the
livestock production index has remained dismayingly below the 1989-91 value, going from 82.6 in
1979-81 to 96.1 in 1995-97. Being Mozambique an agricultural country, whose main resource is
arable land and whose population is overwhelmingly dependent on agricultural, the output growth
picture looks pretty skew, with agriculture as the neglected sector.
After having looked at output, let us now take a closer look at labor productivity. As we
already mentioned above, Mozambique has a vast territory potentially fit for agriculture, and it was
largely exploited, at least in the last century, for the production of raw commodities.10 Yet,
agricultural output, which has always been important, was never dominant in terms of total output
although it always dominated exports. In the colonial economy, production of services (mostly
transport and communication, i.e. shipping) and a largely unproductive agriculture were the major
contributors to gross aggregate output. With the centrally-planned state economy of the socialist
era, a big emphasis was given to industrialization as well as to collective and cooperative farming,
with the effect of depressing small scale farming and rural household production. In the meantime,
Mozambique lost its importance as a shipping deck for its inland neighbors (for various political
reasons), which further depressed its small service economy. The dark war years accounted for the
remaining blows to development: the national industry gradually declined, the service industry
never picked up. After turning to market economy principles, things got better, and especially in the
recent years the revival in the “corridor strategy” resounded the old catchwords of the port
economy, though the promised rewards are still to come.11
As yet, agriculture continues to absorb 83% of the labor force, which means that 83% of
the working population contributes in producing about a third of national output (as of 1997). In
1970, the labor force in agriculture was 86% of total labor force (T le 5), while agricultural output
was a little less than a third of total output: if this is what the World Bank indicators term “long
term structural change”, we may say that things have not gotten much better in more than 25 years.
Productivity in agriculture has steadily declined during the seventies and eighties at an average rate
of –1.3% and –2.1% per year, respectively (Tabl  5). Over the whole period 1970-97, agricultural
product per worker has declined at a rate of –0.66% per year, that is, in real terms, agricultural
output per worker has gone in 27 years from 35,000 to less than 30,000 meticais. While in 1970
there were almost 4.7 million people working in agriculture, there were 7.5 in 1997 (with an
average growth rate over the period of 1.75% per year). On the other hand, total labor force has
grown at a higher rate over the period (1.89% per year), which implies that labor force in other
sectors has grown much faster, although it has grown at a slower rate than population (2.13%),
(which in turn implies that less and less people get jobs). Hence: growth in agricultural output was
obtained through a labor force increase at the expense of productivity. From 1970 to 1997, total real
                                                 
10 See e.g. Zeleza (1993). Interestingly, crop exports in 1897 were (in percentage terms) the same as in 1997!
11 We are referring to the planned infrastructural projects of the Beira c rridor (linking Zimbabwe to the coast) and the
Maputo corridor (linking Transvaal to the Maputo bay).
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GDP has increased at an average 0.76% rate per year, as opposed to the 1.08% rate of agricultural
product. However, while GDP has picked up during the nineties, with an average 5% annual growth
rate, agricultural output has plunged at a dismaying 1.9% per year.
Industry has gone through several structural changes since 1970. The big impetus given by
the socialist industrialization policy shows up in the 15% annual growth rate of industrial output in
the first decade of independence. The increase in industrial labor force during the seventies was also
accompanied by an increase in productivity at a 12% annual rate (in 1980, output per worker in
industry was ten times higher than rural output). The war and the demise of the centrally planned
state economy then brought the industrial sector almost to collapse in the eighties (with an actual
output growth rate of –4.5% per year): while the labor force in industry kept growing during the
decade, productivity plunged by a –7% per year. In the nineties, things have gotten better:
productivity is increasing at a satisfying 3.8% per year, while total output runs at an annual 5.7%.
The story about the service sector is equally telling. Independence, the socialist regime,
and a series of international events12 brought Mozambique to isolation in the region, with
devastating effects on its “port economy” and shipping and transport sector. The whole sector
gradually collapsed, and all the incoming labor force contributed to the fall in productivity (–10%
per year). Over the eighties and especially over the nineties, the sector has gradually recovered.
Output has steadily increased at a 3.6% per year in the 1980’s and at a 6.3% per year in the 1990’s.
Productivity, on the other hand, has remained almost stagnant during the eighties, and only recently
has picked up at a good 6.4% per year. Overall, a worker in the service sector today produces more
than one and a half the amount produced by a worker in the industrial sector and more than 12 times
the amount produced by a worker in the rural sector. Yet, the sector today employs less than a tenth
of total labor force (and only 3% of working women).
In conclusion, although we do not have detailed data to analyze the sub-sector
contributions to total GDP over the years, it is pretty clear that the bulk of overall economic growth
in the recent years has come from the industry and service sectors. Yet, the rural sector still employs
more than 4/5 of total labor force and 96% of the female labor force. If economic growth has to be
sustainable and steady, it should certainly spread over to agriculture, and make the economic
structure of Mozambique less uneven.
                                                 
12 Like the sanctions to Rhodesia.
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Table 5. Agricultural output, labor force and agricultural labor productivity, selected years.
Year 1970 1980 1990 1997 Average
growth rate
1970-97
GDP at constant 1987 local prices
(million Meticais)
549,978 499,178 479,462 674,054 0.76%
Average growth rate over previous period -1.0% -0.4% 5.0%
Total population 9390000121000001570700016600000 2.13%
Labor force (LF) 5432231 7000000 8515843 9000000 1.89%
Agriculture GDP % of total GDP 30 37 37.3 32.7
Agriculture GDP at constant 1987 local prices
(million Meticais)
164,993 184,695 178,839 220,415 1.08%
Average growth rate over previous period 2.1% 0.1% -1.9%
LF in agriculture (% of total LF) 86 85 84 83
LF in agriculture 4671719 5950000 7153308 7470000 1.75%
Productivity in agriculture (GDP/LF)
(meticais per worker)
35318 31041 25001 29507 -0.66%
Average growth rate over previous period -1.3% -2.1% 1.7%
Industry GDP % of total GDP 7.3 35 22.9 24 4.51%
Industry GDP at constant 1987 local prices
(million Meticais)
40,148 174,712 109,797 161,773 5.30%
Average growth rate over previous period 15.8% -4.5% 5.7%
LF in industry (% of total LF) 6.9 7.5 8.0 8.6
LF in industry 373466 525525 678883 772920 2.73%
Productivity in industry (GDP/LF)
(meticais per worker)
107502 332453 161732 209301 2.50%
Average growth rate over previous period 12.0% -7.0% 3.8%
Service GDP as % of total GDP 62.7 28 39.8 43.3
Service GDP at constant 1987 local prices
(million Meticais)
344,836 139,770 190,826 291,865 -0.62%
Average growth rate over previous period -8.6% 3.2% 6.3%
LF in services % of total labor force 8.9 8.2 9.5 8.9
LF in services 482111 576975 813093 803880 1.91%
Productivity in services (GDP/LF)
(meticais per worker)
715264 242246 234691 363071 -2.48%
Average growth rate over previous period -10.3% -0.3% 6.4%
Population age 15-64 4656198 6000000 7569639 8000000 2.02%
Children 10-14 (% of age group) 42 39 36 33
Female population (% of LF) 49 49 48 48
Males in agriculture (% of male LF) 72 72 70 70
Females in agriculture (% of female LF) 97 97 96 96
Males in industry (% of male LF) 13 14 14.5 15.5
Male LF in industry 360157 499800 642095 725400 2.63%
Females in industry (% of female LF) 0.5 0.75 0.9 1.1
Female LF in industry 13309 25725 36788 47520 4.83%
Males in services (% of male LF) 15 14 15.5 14.5
Male LF in services 415566 499800 686377 678600 1.83%
Females in services (% of female LF) 2.5 2.25 3.1 2.9
Female LF in services 66545 77175 126716 125280 2.37%
Source: ADI (1999), WDI (1998), our calculations.
On the demand side, also, structural changes have occurred. The structure of aggregate
demand itself has quite changed over the years. In 1980, private consumption accounted for 94% of
GDP, and only for 76% in 1997. General government consumption has also decreased, going from
15% of GDP in 1980 to 10% of GDP in 1997. Gross domestic investment has apparently increased,
going from 8% in 1980 to 30% in 1997, although gross domestic savings keep being short of
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investment, as they were –8% of GDP in 1980 and were only 14% of GDP in 1997. While exports
have only improved a little bit (going from 15% of GDP in 1980 to 18% in 1997), imports have
remained high (from 32% of GDP in 1980 to 34% of GDP in 1997).
Government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, has steadily increased since 1960
(Figure 5) undergoing changes of regimes and reaching a peak during the socialist era (it is in 1981
that it topped the highest level ever — more than 40% — at the zenith of the socialist government
effort in the field of public spending in education and health, as well as in state industrialization).
After a slight decline, and the worse war years, it is only form 1992 (the end of the war) that the
decreasing trend has consistently improved. This has been almost paralleled by a steady increase,
after 1993 by a constant increase of private investment vis-à-vis GDP (F gure 5).
Figure 5. Shares of GDP (at current international prices)
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What is also very interesting about the evolution of the structure of aggregate demand in
Mozambique is the behavior of private consumption over the years. Overall, private consumption in
real terms has declined in the last two decades, going from 2672 millions of US dollars in 1980 to
2092 millions in 1997 (WDI 1999). Thus, the average annual growth rate of private consumption
has been negative over the 1980-90 period (–2.3%), and only slightly positive during the nineties
(0.9%). Per capita private consumption, on the other hand, has steadily decreased over the whole
period, showing a dismaying annual growth rate of –3.8% during the eighties and an annual growth
rate of –1.5% during the nineties. The overall average annual growth rate over the 1980-1997
period of per capita private consumption has been equal to a saddening –2.3%.
As we said above, Mozambique’s performance in per capita GNP in US dollars as valued
according to the World Bank Atlas conversion method was pretty dismaying vis-à-vis the other
Southern African countries (Table 6). However, since exchange rates do not always reflect
international differences in relative prices, by converting per capita GNP values into international
dollars using purchasing power parities, we can get a better estimate of what money can actually
buy in each country and what each country can actually buy with what it produces. Values of per
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capita GNP in PPP international dollars show a slightly different picture, from which it emerges that
Mozambique seems actually less poor than Tanzania. Values for per-capita GDP show an even
better picture, whereby Mozambique’s product, in PPP terms, is actually higher than Tanzania’s and
Malawi’s and close to Zambia’s. The same is true for per capita private consumption, which in a
way is the closest indication to a relative measure of standard of living. When measured at the
official exchange rate, it seems that Mozambicans are actually spending very little, on average, in a
year (and everybody in southern Africa is spending more). When measured in international dollars,
we see that Mozambicans are actually buying “more stuff” with their money than people from
Tanzania, Malawi, and Angola and almost as much as people from Zambia. Yet, all of these
countries are on the very bottom of the spending scale (up to 750 dollars per year, i.e. a little more
than 60 dollars per month). A better living standard is enjoyed by people from Zimbabwe and
Lesotho (less then 1750 dollars per year), and a much better one is enjoyed by those from Namibia
and Botswana (up to 2700 dollars per year) and South Africa (less than 5000 dollars). Mozambique
trails sadly in the poor bunch, but those who can buy the least today are those from war-torn
Angola.
Table 6. Selected Southern African Countries by GNP, GDP, and Private Consumption per capita, in US and
international dollars
GNP per capita
(1997)
GDP per capita
(1997)
Private consumption
Per capita (1997)
Countries Atlas US
dollars
PPP intl
dollars
US dollars PPP intl
dollars
US dollars PPP intl
dollars
South Africa 3400 7190 3370 7752 2089 4806
Botswana 3260 7430 3358 8282 940 2319
Namibia 2200 5100 2024 4901 1113 2696
Zimbabwe 750 2240 776 2407 559 1733
Lesotho 670 2490 459 1759 376 1442
Zambia 380 910 409 962 319 750
Angola 340 820 670 1442 201 433
Malawi 220 700 245 705 208 599
Tanzania 210 620 221 578 183 480
Mozambique 90 690 207 927 157 705
Source: ADI Basic Indicators Table 1.1 (ADI, 1999), our calculations
To get a better and more detailed look at consumption, at this point, we have to use some
different data sources. Statistical information in Mozambique is scarce, it is generally inconsistent
and not comparable over the years, it is scattered and incomplete. Two major sources of information
on private consumption and standards of living of the population are the Household Budget Surveys
that were conducted in 1991-92 in the city of Maputo, in 1992-93 in the other 10 provincial capitals
and at a national level (including rural areas) in 1996-97. Five years is not a long time interval to
show deep differences, but it can more or less indicate a tendency (if numbers are
straightforward).13 We considered the cumulative distribution of households by average monthly
                                                 
13 Results from the three surveys were published in separate reports by DNE (1994) and INE (1999).
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per-capita expenditure, corrected for inflation (i.e. consumption deflator). This was not an easy
calculation to make, as expenditure categories were in current prices (by the hundreds of meticais).
In Table 7 we show the distribution of households by monthly expenditure according to the
three surveys. We should recall that the results are not strictly comparable for various reasons,
principally because the surveys were made according to different sampling methods. We should
also keep in mind that the distributions are given for number of households, and not in per capita
terms. Considering that the average household size varies with the standard of living, that can give a
significant bias.14 In Table 7 we also calculated a “weighted average” of the shares in each
expenditure category, according to the sampling size in the 1991-92 and 1992-93 surveys. Despite
all these caveats, the figures showed in the table are pretty interesting. Between 1991 and 1993,
44% of population lived on less than 100,000 meticais spending per head per month (in 1997
prices), which amounts to approximately 8.6 US dollars or 38.8 international dollars (using a rough
estimate of 5 members per household). Also, in the same period, almost 90% of the whole
population had monthly expenses per head lower than 300,000 meticais (in 1997 prices), that is,
roughly 25.8 US dollars or 116.3 international dollars. The comparison with the 1996-97 survey
shows a slightly better distribution, as the share of the population spending 300,000 meticais per
head is now reduced to 64%. However, the differences between the urban and the rural areas are
striking. More than 54% of population in rural areas still lives with less than 100,000 meticais
spending per head per month, and 97% of population lives with less than 300,000 meticais per head
per month. In a way, it seems that in the rural areas, people are still five years behind in terms of
standards of living.
Two more figures are worth considering from these Household Budget Surveys: earnings
and expenditures. While the average estimated monthly income per head for 1991-93 was equal to
almost 88,500 meticais (7.7 dollars) for Maputo and 69,900 meticais (5.8 dollars) for the other
major cities (expressed in 1997 prices), the national estimated average monthly income per head for
1996-97 is equal to 123,647 meticais (10.7 dollars). Monthly spending per head, on the other hand,
has been estimated in 113,600 meticais (9.8 dollars) for Maputo and 105,600 meticais (9.1 dollars)
for the other major cities, for 1991-93, and in 152,000 meticais (13.1 dollars) for the whole country
for 1996-97. This corresponds to a value of 150,000 meticais (13 dollars) for the rural areas and
200,000 meticais (17.3 dollars) for the urban areas.
In conclusion, households seem to spend more than they declare they are earning15 and
enjoy a better standard of living in the cities. In rural areas, people seem to be living in pretty
indigent conditions and stunningly low consumption patterns. These levels of consumption have
brought to an estimate of an index of incidence of absolute poverty of 69.4% of population
                                                 
14 According to the 1996-97 survey, the average number of members per household in the lowest expenditure quintile in
urban areas is 6.2 and in rural areas is 6.3, while the average number of people in the highest expenditure quintile is 5.0
in urban areas and 2.7 in rural areas.
15 Supposedly, these earning figures also include an estimate of (implicit) rents or property income as well as self-
consumption.
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(headcount index), equal to 71.3% in the rural areas and 62% in urban areas (Ministério do Plano e
Finanças (1998)). Yet, if we consider that still 83% of the labor force is in the rural sector, we can
certainly presume that the vast majority of the population lives far below that level of GDP per head
of 206.7 US dollars accounted for Mozambique as a whole. Economic growth is not affecting the
population evenly, and the distribution of perspective wealth is something that, for the time being, is
regarding only a small fraction of the Mozambican people. Hence, we can certainly say that if
growth is not even from the output side, it is even less even from the demand side.
Table 7. Distributions of households by monthly expenditure categories, selected years
Thousand of
meticais
Maputo
1991-92
survey
Rest of cities
1992-93
survey
Urban areas
(weighted
average)
Whole country
1996-97  survey
Urban areas
1996-97 survey
Rural areas
1996-97 survey
< 500 10.1 55.9 44.0 49.5 20.0 54.6
500-1000 37.4 31.4 33.0 33.8 24.4 46.1
1000-1500 25.1 7.7 12.2 8.4 19.6 6.3
1500-2000 11.1 2.5 4.7 2.9 8.8 1.7
2000-2500 6.3 1.0 2.4 1.6 5.9 0.4
2500-3000 3.1 0.6 1.3 0.8 5.0 0.4
3000-3500 1.9 0.4 0.8 0.7 4.0 0.2
3500-4000 1.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 2.3 0.1
4000-4500 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 2.0 0.1
4500-5000 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.1
>5000 1.3 0.1 0.4 1.7 4.0 0.1
Source: our calculations on data from DNE (1994) and INE (1999).
3. Balanced growth?
Distributional issues are always difficult to assess, particularly when the data available are
not completely reliable. Yet, it seems undeniable that Mozambique has still a long way to go to step
on a sustainable and steady growth path. As we have seen and argued above, Mozambique recent
economic growth has been unprecedented only in relative terms and has been pretty much uneven
across sectors and in terms of aggregate demand components. If growth has to be sustainable and
lasting, it has to be balanced, both in economic terms—all the components that contribute to
national product have to grow accordingly—and in social terms—no permanent social exclusion
can coexist with balanced growth—. Balanced growth is necessary in order for growth to be
sustainable and lasting. If any component of national income, or output, grows too much at the
expense of other components, not only will the economy step off the steady state growth path, but it
will stop growing altogether, generating dangerous economic and social imbalances.
When looking at the disappointing economic performance of African countries in the last
twenty-five years or so, it is easy to conclude that all the recipes have basically failed. Development
aid has long been ill-conceived, and most theories about “the engines of growth” and the policy
implications thereby derived have proved wrong. Clearly, there is no one single cause for this
generalized failure, and explanations abound. The culprit changes with fashion and over long
periods the hunt for the guilty party has produced several victims. In turn: first came the colonial
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ruling powers and their exploiting economic—and political—regimes. Then came the socialist and
Marxist ideologies that inspired cohorts of Third World leaders who have blindly imposed unapt
and unsuited—besides being illiberal—regimes to deprived and hopeful populations. Then next
came the overwhelmingly devouring State that has suffocated vital economies all over Africa,
instead of letting the market develop by itself and “unleash the seeds of economic growth”. Finally
came the unjustly penalizing stabilization programs that have made the already difficult conditions
of highly indebted countries barely bearable. Nowadays, the hunt seems to point to corrupt regimes
who take advantage of the good will of donors and stabilization programs, without enforcing the
rule of law and accountability, and the catch word has become that of governance.
Still, in order to evaluate whether economic growth—or economic performance, for that
matter—is balanced and well geared (and well guided), we have to try to distinguish the role of the
different actors. In the case of Mozambique, the play is complicated, and there are several
characters to account for. Besides, data are sparse and not abundant, and it is often difficult to dig
into the sources to identify root causes. Let us begin with some recent aggregate data and evaluate
them from an economic policy perspective. We start with investment.16
Private investment has only recently picked up a little (Table 8), although public
investment still swallows a considerable share of GDP. Also, foreign direct investment is increasing
considerably every year. On the other hand, gross domestic savings are still far too short of
domestic investment, the difference being now reduced to a –9.8% of GDP (in 1991 savings were
still a negative fraction of GDP and the difference between domestic savings and investment was
equal to –15.% of GDP). On a large scale, industry seems not to be given, as yet, the attention
needed for serious development.17 This can also be seen by looking at energy consumption in
Mozambique. In 1980, electric power consumption per capita was equal to 369.7 kWh (ADI 1999),
a third of Zambia and Zimbabwe’s consumption and a tenth of South Africa’s. While the annual
average from 1975 to 1984 has been of 109 kWh, from 1985 on it has been constantly around the 50
kWh per year (in 1996, energy consumption per capita was about 76 kWh). Over the period 1980-
96, the average growth rate of energy production has been –19.3% per year. Per capita annual
consumption, on the other hand, has increased in Zimbabwe (765 kWh), Zambia (560 kWh) and
South Africa (3719 kWh). Commercial energy use, too, has been decreasing between 1980 and
1996 (WDR 1999): use has gone from 8386 to 7813 in thousand metric tons of oil equivalent. In per
capita terms, use has gone from 693 to 481 kg of oil equivalent. Net energy imports (over
commercial energy use) have gone from –2% to +7% (Mozambique, who used to export, has now
become net importer of energy, after the shutting down of several dams).
                                                 
16 On the role and importance of investment, gross fixed capital formation and (physical and human) capital
accumulation in economic growth in developing countries, see e.g. King and Levine (1994), Fischer, Hernández-Catá,
and Khan (1998), Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (1999).
17 If we exclude the few big industrial development project whose overall impact in terms of employment seems
negligible, whereas their impact on output will be felt only over the next five to ten years.
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Table 8. Economic growth indicators (recent years)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP per capita 173.1133.1140.2147.0151.2175.1206.7233.6
Gross domestic investment (total) as % of GDP 16.0 15.6 12.7 19.8 22.8 19.1 19.1 21.1
   Gross private investment as a percentage of GDP 4.7 2.8 0.4 5.8 10.8 8.6 8.3 11.9
   Gross public investment as % of GDP 11.4 12.8 12.3 14.0 12.0 10.5 10.7 9.1
   Foreign direct investment as % of GDP 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.6 1.9 5.4
Private sector: share in total domestic credit 117.7175.5323.1222.2266.0639.6462.7571.5
Gross domestic savings (total) as % of GDP -11.2 -17.2 -22.4 -13.9 -1.9 -1.6 1.6 1.2
Ratio of M2 to GDP (%) 24.9 32.0 32.4 28.5 26.5 20.9 20.9 20.8
Revenue, excluding cap. Grants  (% GDP) 16.6 20.3 18.5 17.8 15.0 13.8 16.0 15.4
Fiscal balance, excluding cap. Grants, (% GDP) -10.1 -10.0 -11.0 -13.2 -9.3 -7.1 -7.5 -6.4
Capital grants, as a % of GDP 7.0 7.3 7.4 7.8 6.1 4.2 4.9 4.0
Fiscal balance, including Grants (% GDP) -3.1 -2.7 -3.6 -5.3 -3.2 -2.9 -2.6 -2.4
Revenue, incl. all grants (% GDP) 23.6 27.6 25.9 25.6 21.2 18.0 21.0 19.5
Expenditure, as % of GDP 26.7 30.3 29.5 30.9 24.4 20.9 23.6 21.8
Government efficiency in resource management -14.2 -16.5 -15.5 -19.2 -13.0 -10.1 -11.9 -10.5
Government wage bill as % of recurrent budget 22.1 18.8 20.5 16.6 22.6 23.6 22.1 24.6
Total tax revenues as a % of GDP 10.6 12.1 12.7 10.4 10.4 9.9 10.7 10.5
Total tax revenues as a % of total expenditures & net lending39.8 39.8 43.1 33.7 42.5 47.6 45.2 48.3
Capacity for resource management -14.2 -16.5 -15.5 -19.2 -13.0 -10.1 -11.9 -10.5
Source: ADI 1999.
In conclusion, Mozambique seems to be investing too little in physical industrial capital.
Moreover, not only is its physical capital stock growing slowly, but its human capital stock also is
lagging. Investment in education was one of the first national priorities on the policy agenda of the
Mozambican Government in the aftermath of independence. Portugal colonial rule had, in fact, left
a country with a stunning 93% illiteracy rate (DNE 1985). Education policy began to pay quickly,
as by 1980 the illiteracy rate had fallen to 72%, and gross enrollment in primary school was an
amazing 99%. However, the internal war18 and the crumbling of the centralized state system
produced their dire effects in the years to come. In 1997, a big 60.9% of the population was still
illiterate (INE 1999).19 In 1996, gross enrollment ratio in primary school was down to 60% of
relevant age group, and only 7% for secondary school (WDI 1999).
If investment is still low and human capital accumulation lacking, infrastructures are no
better. Overall, the State has been able to guarantee some improvement in the living conditions of
the population, but much remains to be done, particularly in the rural areas. The percentage of
population that has access to safe water has increased from 9% in 1982 to 24% in 1995. Yet, all of
Mozambique’s neighboring countries have higher values.20 In 1995, only 23% of the whole
Mozambican population—and only 68% of urban population—had access to sanitation (in 1982 it
was only 10%),21 only 32% of pregnant women would get a tetanus vaccination (in 1995-97) and
                                                 
18 It is acknowledged that the RENAMO guerrilla was purposely targeting schools and hospitals to weaken the
FRELIMO Government’s popularity (see, for instance, Hanlon (1991)).
19 According to WDR 1999, the adult illiteracy rate in 1997 was 43% for the male and 75% for the female population.
20 In Tanzania, the poorest of the neighbors, that percentage goes up to 49, in Malawi to 60, in Zambia to 53, and in
Zimbabwe to 77 (data are for 1995 (WDI 1999)).
21 In Tanzania, that percentage for 1995 goes up to 86, in Malawi to 64, in Zambia to 51, and in Zimbabwe to 66 (WDI
1999).
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70% of children get measles vaccination under 12 months. Main roads and rural roads need major
improving, and the whole transport and communication system of the country still seems in the
same conditions as it was at the end of the war. Between 1990 and 1997, for instance, the
percentage of paved road over total has only increased from 17 to 19 percent (WDR 1999).
These limited and scattered data show how fragile economic development has been until
now in Mozambique. The high growth rates in some sectors or parts of the economy correspond to
isolated peaks of an otherwise pretty flat economic landscape, the isolated escapes of individual
hares that pull a whole army of trailing turtles. It is thanks to the few success initiatives-hot ls,
some services related to the aid business, some banks, industry stars-that growth figures blink. And
yet, the growth process looks unbalanced, with a neglected agricultural sector, a penalized
distribution sector, and an almost forgotten education sector. When capital accumulation is so
unbalanced, growth will not be sustained, and the country will be sooner or later be asked to
provide for the lacking capital-physical and human. At that point, it might be late to catch up.
4. The role of Government
If economic growth is unbalanced, it is difficult to define what the Government’s proper
role should be and what the Government should do to guarantee balanced economic growth,
especially given that the State has always been overwhelmingly present in all spheres of the
economic and social life. As Goldsmith (1998) puts it, “governments can fail to meet their
responsibilities in two ways commonly lumped together. Type-1 failures refer to activities that
government should not undertake; Type-2 failures refer to activities that governments should, but
do not, undertake” (p. 6). Basically, type-1 failures require reducing the role of the State, while
type-2 failures require increasing and strengthening the role of the State. Type-1 failures are
claimed responsible for most of the problems that SSA countries have faced in the last twenty
years22 and yet type-2 failures, i.e. the State neglecting necessary actions, have until recently not
been given much attention.
The recipe to cure type-1 failures embraced by the World Bank’s and IMF’s Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP) reduced to a simple formula: downsize the role of the State, increase
the role of markets and of the private sector and integrate the national economy in the global
market. However, the baby was often thrown away with the bath water: the Government’s positive
functions have come out weakened and its capacity diminished. SAP’s gave way to a flow of
foreign aid from international donors, and actually in many cases foreign loans have been used by
State leaders as a last resort to avoid more radical changes and release power. By 1993, 38 African
countries (out of 48) had adopted at least one SAP. Nevertheless, only six countries have been
classified as having “significantly improved” their policies (WB (1994)). The World Bank and IMF,
as well as international donors, have come under heavy criticism as their policies have supposedly
                                                 
22 This is what Williamson (1993) calls the Washington consensus on economic strategy that gave rise to the Structural
Adjustment Programs after 1981 and the Berg Report. According to this consensus, the State has grown too big,
displacing the private sector, and is inappropriately occupying areas that could otherwise receive a better destination.
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imposed too harsh conditions on economies already weak and battered, putting national
governments under pressure and eroding national autonomy. Macroeconomic stability has had to be
reached at the expense of social expenditures and welfare policies. But they have also been
criticized for their leniency with aid, as often the party in charge of government would bear the cost
of the heavy policy to guarantee political stability against the risk that unreliable opposition parties
would seize the power. This, once the policy obedience was guaranteed, has ushered in corruption
and “connivance” with ugly regimes (as in the Mobutu case).
The recent academic and political reflection on aid and economic growth concedes (often
unofficially) that most approaches to post-colonial development have been mistaken. It is certainly
true that SSA’s weak performance in the last twenty years has been partly due to government, i.e.
non-market, failures. But, at a closer look, it appears that a lot of the recorded economic setbacks
can be ascribed more to market failures than to government. Which brings us to the conclusion that
it is not because governments have done too much, but because they have not done what they
should to avoid market failures. Mozambique seems to be a case in point. If sustained, balanced
economic growth has not yet happened, if the economy is not mature, it is not only because of the
heavy burden of an overgrown and entrenched State. It is not only because the Government has
failed to “shrink” giving “way to free market forces”. On the contrary, it is because markets often
are defective, it is because the “Washington consensus” and the free market orthodoxy have
frequently been a-historical and have not taken into account the lack of social and human capital,
the absence of rules to support the markets and their functioning, the ignorance about practices that
limit entrepreneurial capacity and capitalist development.
In the case of Mozambique, Government actions are still affected by type-1 failures.
Government expenditure, as a share of GDP, is still sizeable (Figur  5): it was still more than 30%
in 1994 (a general election year), and it has been reduced to 22% in 1998. Good proceeds from
privatizations have accrued more than 120 million US dollars for the State,23 but many large public
enterprises have not been really put on the block (the Government wage bill has never been as high
as in 1998) and in other privatized companies the Administration Councils are chaired by former
State managers or functionaries appointed by the Government. Overall, the privatization process has
affected more than 900 enterprises since 1989. Until the end of 1997, almost three quarters of these
companies had been sold or liquidated, while less than 20 percent had turned into joint ventures.
Although most enterprises have been bought by Mozambican nationals, the result of the
privatization program are mixed, with only a marginal effect on State revenues. For instance, in
1994 (the year with largest net receipts from privatization), receipts from privatization amounted to
just 1.4 percent of Government revenues and 0.2 percent of GDP (IMF (1998, Table 33)).
The State budget balance has recently marginally improved, although it still looms on the
negative side. The efficiency in resource management indica or (ADI, 1999) measures the ability of
the Government to finance its expenditures with its own resources, and is proxied by fiscal deficit
                                                 
23 Although UTRE report claims these proceeds to be in the order of 10% of GDP (UTRE (1998)).
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(excluding grants) in percentage of GDP. As we see in Table 8, things in the recent years got pretty
bad until 1994 and then started to turn better, but there is still need for improvement. Mozambique’s
mean external-trade tariff in 1997 was equal to 15.6% (with a standard deviation of 14.3%), much
lower than Malawi (30%), Tanzania (21.8%) and Zimbabwe (24%), but higher than South Africa
(8.7%) and Zambia (13.6%). Moreover, Mozambique’s (recorded) integration with the global
economy has actually deteriorated. Trade in goods, in terms of PPP-measured GDP24 has gone from
15.7% in 1987 to 11.9% in 1997, whereas in terms of goods GDP25 has gone from 73.6% in 1987 to
89.1 in 1997. Over the 1987-97 period, growth in trade less growth in real GDP amounted to –1.2%.
Given this unimpressive economic performance, the limited reduction of the State role and the still
unproven improved State capacity to manage its finances and the economy, Mozambique’s credit
rating still looms on the bottom tiers of all confidence indexes. For instance, the Composite ICRG
risk rating and the Institutional Investor credit rating for Mozambique in February and March 1999
have been, respectively, 58.5 and 17.9 (WDR, 1999), some of the lowest of all SSA.26
While type-1 failures (the Government does “too much”) are still pretty evident for the
Government’s economic policy in Mozambique, type-2 failures are less easy to prove. These
failures, as we said, refer to what the Government should do and does not, to the services and
actions the Government should provide and does not, or that the Government does inappropriately.
In a modern economic system, the natural role of the Government (and the State) should be to
guarantee the rule of law. This involves regulating the proper and correct functioning of the
markets, providing order, security, and a certainty environment, providing public goods with equity
and redistributing income to correct for market failures, gearing the economy towards more
efficient objectives when productivity is low or capacity is slack.
That an even properly decentralized free market would provide neither a certainty and
legal environment nor the enforcement of collectively adopted rules and norms, is agreed by almost
everybody. As the “free rider” problem demonstrates, there is always a need to design compliance
mechanisms and since it is always necessary to foresee penalties for those who do not comply,
some authority has to be put in charge of enforcing collective rules. The role of the State, or any
authority for that matter, is to foster the provision of law enforcement and to guarantee a legal
framework. However, it often happens that incompetence, dishonesty and political bias impair
Governments’ actions, especially when transparency and public scrutiny are lacking.
To evaluate Government’s supply of public goods like law and order in Mozambique as
reflected in the functioning of the economy, we can use as quantitative indicator the so-called
measure of Government capacity given by contract intensive money (Clague et al. (1997)). This is
given by the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply. This indicator reflects the idea that
                                                 
24 That is, the sum of merchandise exports and imports measured in PPP international dollars.
25 That is, the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the current value of GDP is US dollars after
subtracting value added in services.
26 The Composite ICRG risk rating and the I stitutional Investors credit rating for the other Southern African countries
were, respectively: Angola (46.5, 11.5), Botswana (82.0, 53.5), Malawi (70.8, 20.4), Namibia (77.8, n.a.), Tanzania
(58.8, 18.3), South Africa (68.8 and 45.8), Zimbabwe (52.0, 26.5) and Zambia (59.8, 16.1).
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in a well-governed economy currency is only used for small transactions and so the proportion of
transactions that rely on third-party enforcement (like the Central Bank or the Government) is large.
In Mozambique, it is difficult to assess the exact figures for total money supply. With a narrow
definition of money as (national) currency in circulation plus deposits (in national and foreign
currency), the ratio between deposits and total money is more or less equal to 79%, as of December
1997.27 However, this measure completely misses the large amount of dollars that is circulating in
the country (which the Bank of Mozambique is obviously not accounting for in its financial
accounts). A rough estimate of the amount of circulating dollars could be given by the proportion of
foreign-currency denominated deposits accounts over total deposits (41%).28 This would imply a
ratio of non-currency to total money supply of 69% , which is in line with the rest of SSA countries
(Clague et al. (1997)). On this basis, we could thus conclude that confidence in Government’s
capability, like in most African countries is still pretty low and certainly lower than in the rest of the
world.
The evaluation of Government’s supply of public goods like social welfare goods r “merit
goods” is simpler than that of law, certainty and order. Besides being useful for a better functioning
of markets and providing economic stability, the supply of social welfare goods is an important
source of political legitimacy. However, it has to be balanced by the capacity of the Government to
provide for its funding. The adoption of Keynesian policies by many SSA countries in the aftermath
of independence in the sixties and seventies and the over-extended presence of the State—not just
in centrally planned economies—led many Governments to take charge of social programs (in the
fields of education, health and food provision) that they could not sustain for long (for various
reasons). Once more, Mozambique is a point in case. The spending cuts that have been imposed by
budget constraints in the late eighties have cast a negative light on Government willingness and
ability to provide for those programs. Yet, the blame has fallen on international agencies and
donors, who are supposedly choking weak economies and Governments’ desire to do good to
provide services, where Governments are not able to do the good they would like to. However, the
evidence is not so clear-cut. In the first place, the social costs of reducing spending are almost never
compared with the social opportunity cost of not doing so (going bankrupt, even for a State, has
negative consequences...). Secondly, it is often argued that the cost of reducing spending is always
borne by the poor or those at the lower end of the income distribution. Even this is not necessarily
the case, since it depends on the actual policy measures taken by the Government.
                                                 
27 Circulating banknotes and coins amounted to 1544 billions of meticais, while total money and quasi-money amounted
to 7414 billions of meticais
28 In this case, total circulating money would amount to 2617 billions of meticais, giving rise to a total money and
quasi-money of 8486 billions of meticais.
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Table 9. Provision of social welfare goods
1980 1997
Public expenditure on health (over GDP) 1.7%
Public expenditure on education (over GDP) 4.0%
11.4%*
Population with access top safe water 9%b 24c
Population with access to health services 10%b 23c
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 145 135
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 6.5 5.4
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 1100a
Prevalence of children malnutrition (over children of age under 5) 26%d
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000) 223 201
Life expectancy at birth (male) 44
Life expectancy at birth (female) 47
Health care personnel 3457 7361e
Health care units 934 990e
Prenatal appointments and health services offered (thousands) 7635 8160e
Deliveries 248 181e
Population of age 5-24 (millions) 6.1 8.5e
Enrolled students (thousands) 1472 1776e
Total Enrollment ratio 24.1% 20.9%e
Illiteracy rate 72.6% 60.6%
Public schools (number) 5886 5553e
Sources: DNE 1985, INE 1996, WDI 1999, WDR 1999, our calculations.
Notes. *) Expenditure for education and health together (for health alone it was an average 4.6% over the period 1990-
97); a) 1990-97; b) 1982; c) 1995; d) 1992-97; d) 1997.
The provision of the major social welfare goods—health and education—in Mozambique
has not particularly improved since 1980. Surely, Mozambique has had more than 10 years of a
cruel and destructive internal war, fought by a guerrilla movement that purposely attacked those
objectives that had made the Government popular during the first years of independence. Around
the beginning of the eighties, the social effort of the Government reached its zenith, and yet in terms
of budget it was relatively contained. Some improvements have been made recently, but only after a
long period during which things had gotten worse again and the levels of social welfare provision
had fallen back to colonial lows.29 From 1980 to 1997 (Table 9), the illiteracy rate has improved,
and so has infant mortality rate, but total enrollment ratio has decreased, and the number of public
schools is smaller. The population with access to health services and water has increased, but there
are only a few more health care units today than in 1980. Is the provision of health care better than
before? Deliveries at public hospitals and health units have rather decreased and the total number of
doctor appointments has only marginally increased. Conversely, the number of personnel and
medical staff has enormously increased, and this alone might explain why public health swallows
much more of the State budget than before. This does not necessarily translate into better health for
more people. Improved access might simply be due to a much higher urban population than 20
                                                 
29 Social spending and its effectiveness reached a peak at the beginning of the eighties but from then on they kept
declining. There were 5886 primary schools in 1983, and only 3381 in 1992. More than 1.33 million pupils were
enrolled in primary schools in 1983, and less than 1.2 millions were enrolled in 1992. Likewise, there were 1380
functioning health units (hospitals, health posts) in the country in 1983, and there were only 1040 in 1992. Conversely,
while only 3.2% of Government expenditure was devoted to education and health in 1983, 11.4% was spent in 1992
(data are from DNE 1985, and INE 1996).
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years ago.30 It is for those out there in the mato that conditions seem to be the same as ever. Nobody
of those who moved to the cities during the war years seems willing to return, having experienced
that even shanty towns may have a fountain for every 100 families and a posto de saude for every
10,000 people.
Provision of social welfare goods is also linked with redistribution of income and tax
collection. On this issue we know that many Governments do not have a good record, because of
incompetence, incapacity or collusion. A good fiscal policy can be exercised only if the
Government authority is recognized and the public administration is able and willing to enforce the
State law. In Mozambique, total revenues as a percentage of total expenditures have increased in the
recent years but still remain low (Table 8). However, it is not only a matter of an inefficient
bureaucracy unable (and unwilling) to collect taxes, nor it is simply a deliberate policy of avoiding
to target particular interest groups. In a country like Mozambique, the State still appears to need to
affirm its authority and those roles of provider of public goods we were discussing above. The State
has not yet deployed over the territory all of its apparatus and the connection of norms, rules and
dues that any institution carries. Deep down, at the low level of everyday life, the State is often not
“recognized”. An equitable fiscal policy can only be enforced by a State that provides services in
exchange for taxes. Failing to collect taxes and having to depend on other sources of revenue (like
foreign aid) can only impair the provision of services.
The third example of type-2 failures is the lack of an industrial policy targeted at
improving the overall productivity of the economy. A typical example, in this respect, is
Mozambique’s adopting policies meant at keeping industrial giants and big plants even in
conditions of near-bankruptcy. The history of industrial policy in Mozambique is still to be written,
yet there are plenty of episodes and anecdotes that can be recounted. Many bankrupt industries,
companies or banks are privatized, thanks to the injection of foreign capital, with the short-run aim
of keeping occupation unchanged and often the undeclared objective of providing political clout for
future projects or permissions. These are all well known examples of an ill-conceived industrial
policy. As yet, data on privatizations, employment, company solvency and performance are not
available, and Government information is not made public. Industrial policy is just an example of
the failures and unevenness of economic policy in Mozambique. There is no policy aimed at
stimulating the agricultural sector, particularly at the level of small household farming, as we
pointed out earlier. Also, there is no policy aimed at re-equilibrating the economy at the local level,
and some areas of the country, particularly in the center and the north, trail behind. The uneven
targeting of economic policy contributes to the unbalanced growth.
In conclusion, economic growth in Mozambique still appears to be out of balance, besides
being weak and uneven, and no one is blameless. The Government of Mozambique certainly bears
some responsibility for what we have referred to as type-1 and type-2 failures. One of the most
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homeless.
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common explanations of why this happens is that Governments in Africa have often very little room
for maneuvering and making mistakes, constrained as they are by an ever-mounting debt and an
ever-increasing need for aid. Mozambique is a good example. The country’s total stock of debt31
has gone from 2.87 billion dollars in 1985 to 5.99 billions in 1997. For this reason Mozambique has
been included in the list of highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) and has now been entitled to
participate in the so-called HIPC debt-forgiveness initiative. The key indebtedness ratios for 1995-
97 are some of the worst in SSA: the ratio between total debt stock and exports, for instance, was
equal to 1217%; while the ratio over GNP was equal to 264%; the ratio between net present value
of total debt outstanding and exports was equal to 708%, while the ratio between total debt service
and exports was about 29% and that between interest payments and exports was about 12%.32
Mozambique has received massive aid flows in the recent years, particularly after 1987’s
drastic change in economic policy and the subsequent adhesion to the IMF. Economic inefficiency
and mismanagement, droughts and calamities, and the internal war, all led to the economic downfall
of the eighties, to which the international donors have responded with increased aid flows, financial
and technical assistance. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all donors in
Mozambique has been accumulating over the eighties, reaching a peak in 1992 in terms of GDP
(Table 10).33 After the peace accord in 1992, the aggregate net resource flow (excluding IMF funds)
has continued at an average 860 million dollars per year between 1992 and 1996 (765 million
dollars in 1997), while official flows (including grants) have equaled 824 million dollars per year
between 1992 and 1996 (and 728 million dollars in 1997). On the other hand, total debt outstanding
and disbursed (DOD) between 1991 and 1997 has been more than 12 times higher than exports.34
Also, gross disbursements (official concessional long-term loans) have gone from 98 to 272 million
dollars in the six years from 1991 to 1996.
It is difficult to treat the debt issue from a critical point of view. Mozambique is one of the
mostly indebted countries in the world and, since it also has one of the lowest GNP per capita, it is
easy to conclude that the challenge is daunting. The accumulated debt is frightening, as is the debt
service. If one adds that the potential of the economy is weak (as measured by export and GDP
growth), the conclusion looks bleak. This is what has motivated the HIPC debt forgiveness
initiative. And yet, one wonders what has led Mozambique to such a ruinous slide. A higher debt
means a heavier burden, and the heavier the burden the stronger has the economy to be to overcome
it. And it is true that a few “bad” years at the beginning of the 1980’s plus a savage and destructive
                                                 
31 As reported by the World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF 1999).
32 Among other SSA countries, only Sao Tomé, Guinea Bissau and Sudan had a worst debt stock/export ratio, while the
Congo Republic and Angola also had a worse debt stock/GNP ratio. Debt service over exports, on the other hand, was
higher than 29% for 7 countries.
33 In 1980, GDP in current prices was equal 2454 millions of US dollars (evaluated at the official exchange rate, see
DNE 1985), while net ODA were 169 millions (6.9%). In 1987, GDP in current prices was equal to 1462 million dollars
(DNE 1991), while net ODA was already 667 millions (45.6%). In 1990, GDP at current prices was down to 1443
million dollars, while net ODA reached 1007 million dollars (69.8%). For data on ODA, see ADI 1999.
34 Most of the debt is still long-term debt (91%), increasingly multilateral (it is now 30%) and for the great part still
bilateral (69%).
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guerrilla war along the whole decade put Mozambique on its knees. But it should be remembered
that the patient was already sick and weak.
This weakness can be demonstrated by looking at data on the trade deficit and the current
account balance (Table 10). The trade deficit in 1980 was equal to 519.4 million dollars (21.2% of
GDP), in 1985 it was up to 347.1 millions (10.2% of GDP), and it then kept increasing until 1994
when it reached 869 millions (59.4% of GDP). It is now equal to 581 millions (a little more than a
quarter of GDP). Over nineteen years, the cumulated deficit has added up to 10,739 million dollars,
while over the decade 1987-97 has totaled 7,333 millions. Similarly, Mozambique’s current account
balance, which has kept being negative all through the eighties and the nineties, in 1998 has reached
the cumulated amount of 11.8 billions starting from 1980, and of 8.5 billions if we just limit to the
1987-97 period. One should also consider that, in these calculations, interest payments seem to be
just a relatively small fraction: the cumulated sum paid from 1980 is of 2 billion dollars, i.e. 17% of
total current account balance (CAB), of which 1.7 was paid after 1987. Consider also that the
cumulated amount of grants received from 1980 is equal to 5.3 billions (4.5 of which where given
after 1987), and thus the cumulated CAB totals 6.5 billions. Obviously, a country cannot be
permanently in deficit, and yet, a country cannot be permanently receiving aid and grants, in a
perennial inflow of money.
Table 10. Current account, aid, grants and loans, recent years
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CAB before capital grants (% GDP) -29.6 -37.8 -39.2 -38.1 -28.3 -22.7 -17.8 -20.4
CAB before capital grants (millions US$) -738.4-738.4-824.5-864.3-676.8-645.2-610.3-808.3
Net ODA as % of GDP 42.9 75.1 56.3 54.3 46.0 32.5 27.5 n.a.
Net ODA as % of GDP (current prices and dollars)74.6 114.2 80.6 84.2 74.2 53.1 30.3 n.a.
Net ODA (millions of US$) 1070.31468.21183.11231.21101.2922.9 945.2 n.a.
Gross disbursements: offic. concessional long-term loans98 187 155 221 219 272 338 n.a.
Debt service ratio1, ex-post 22.6 22.8 32.9 30.1 34.8 26.0 18.2 31.0
DOD as % of exports2 1292.01417.21397.61371.61228.81070.11046.81231.3
Present value of DOD (% exports) .. .. .. .. .. 757.3 770.4 721.9
Notes:
1) Calculated as the sum of debt service due on long-term debt, IMF use of Fund credit and interest payment on short-
term debt, divided by exports of goods and services and workers’ remittances from abroad.
2) Calculated as the sum of Debt Outstanding and Disbursed (DOD) on long-term debt, IMF use of Fund credit and
short-term debt, divided by exports of goods and services and workers’ remittances from abroad.
Source: ADI 1999.
If the cumulated sum of past deficits is striking, no less amazing is the cumulated sum of
all past aid, grants and loans. Net official development assistance (ODA) from 1980 to 1997 totaled
11.5 billion dollars, while gross disbursements on official long-term loans by Mozambique have
been equal to no more than 2.25 billions. Thus, with a total cumulated stock of debt of almost 6
billion dollars, Mozambique has been able to pay a little less than 40%. And yet, its trade balance
29
keeps worsening, as does the current account. There seems to be little room for miracles. But, the
question naturally arises: where has all the aid gone?35
As we said earlier, it is difficult to look through the data, especially in Mozambique where
statistics are often incomplete. State budget figures, in a very aggregate format, are available for
some years, and are an interesting source to start with. In 1985, the first year in which a reasonably
comparable budget was released, current expenditure amounted to a 78.3% of total expenditure,
while capital expenditure was devoted the remaining 21.7%. Current expenditure was devoted for
36% to defense (those were war years), 38.4% to salaries, education and health, and for only a tiny
0.2% to interest payments (de facto, there was no debt, still, at that time). Grants and transfers, in
1985, amounted to 9.8% of total expenditure, a good quarter of total State budget deficit. In 1987,
current expenditure decreased to 57.4% of total expenditure, divided between defense (26%),
salaries, education and health (17.4%) and interest payments (6.6%). Capital expenditure increased,
mostly due to disbursements for external projects, as did total deficit. Grants raised to cover 45% of
total budget deficit. In 1989, current expenditure decreased some more to 52.2% of the State
budget, divided into defense (21.6%), salaries, education and health (18%) and interest payments
(6.5%). Capital expenditure kept increasing, mostly to cover disbursements on loans for a 28.6% of
the total budget. On the other hand, grants increased to cover 64.8% of total deficit. Thus, over this
first period grants went from 9 to 65 percent of Government deficit.
In 1991, previous tendencies continued. Current expenditure decreased to 48.5% of total
budget (18.6% for defense, 19.8% for salaries, health and education, 4.8% for interest payments),
while capital expenditure increased to 51.5% of total budget (because of 37.3% for loan
disbursements). Grants received amounted to 77.7% of total deficit. In 1994, the structure of the
State budget was pretty much the same, although interest payments decreased to 3.7% of total
expenditure and loan disbursements increased to 46.4% of total expenditure. Grants reached 72.2%
of budget deficit, now 58.3% of total expenditure. In 1996, current expenditures were down to
45.6% of the budget (and interest payments up to 7%), but loan disbursements reached 44.7% of
total. The deficit raised to an appalling 48.6% of total expenditure, of which almost 70% financed
by foreign grants. Thus, over the 1990’s, grants have covered almost three quarters of the budget
deficit.
In Table 11 we can see a comparison between the cumulated sums of the various deficits
(trade, current account and State budget), of loans and interest payments and of aid and grants
received. Broadly speaking, the trade and current account deficits represent the difference between
inflows and outflows of goods and services. In this case, we can see how poorly the Mozambican
economy is performing and how the net inflow of resources keeps deteriorating. The State budget
deficit, on the other hand, represents the difference between what the State is able to collect (in the
                                                 
35 The recent literature has been questioning the effectiveness of aid—also from a theoretical point of view—and the
causes for inefficiency, with a vast empirical evidence. See e.g. Burnside and Dollar (1997), Guillaumont and Chauvet
(1999), White (1992).
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form of taxes and “credit” and loans from enterprises and households36) and what the State spends.
Apparently, what the State has been accumulating in interest payments and loan disbursements was
more than covered by various forms of aid, whether grants or net ODA.
Now, as one can see, th  amount of aid that Mozambique has received in almost twenty
years would have been enough to cover its net resource deficit, provided the State had been able to
take care of its own expenses. I  other words, the State has been systematically spending too much
or collecting too little. Yet, too little has been spent on education, health, infrastructures and general
welfare. True, without loan disbursements, the State budget deficit would have been lower, and all
the grants received would have made up the remaining difference. This would have freed for the
private sector more resources coming in from abroad. Here we can see a typical distortion of aid
policy and the development strategies of international agencies during the late eighties: to provide
help to the Government, rather than to the country. If the Mozambican State has loans to pay, it is
because donors and agencies have been lending money to the State rather than rough the State o
the country. And very simple economics reminds us how this, eventually, crowds out private
investment.
Table 11. Cumulated sums of deficits, grants, loans, and aid
Cumulated sum
1980-1997
million US dollars
Cumulated sum
1987-1997
million US dollars
1. Trade deficit 10739.3 7332.9
2. Current account deficit (excluding grants) 11775.3 8531.5
3. Grants 5293.1 4491.0
4. Current account deficit (including grants) 6482.2 4040.5
5. Foreign direct investment 257.1 255.6
6. Net ODA 11520.2 11351.2
7. Gross disbursements on long-term loans 2258.4 2257.4
8. Interest payments (in State budget) 472.1 450.3
9. Loan disbursements (in State budget) 2345.2 2345.2
10. State budget deficit 6945.1 3987.8
11. Grants (in State budget) 3124.3 2507.9
12. Current State expenditure (in State budget) 7572.2 3441.5
Sources. 1-5: Balance of payments statistics, DNE 1985, 1987, 1991, 1994, INE 1996; 6-7: ADI (1999); 8-
11: State budgets, DNE 1985, 1987, 1991, 1994, INE 1996.
We know that the political economy of aid is rather complex. Mozambique, like many
other African countries, is an example of a State whose grasp of the economy (and the country) is
still firmly in its hands and yet many of its activities are “sub-contracted” to donors and agencies.
From basic services to infrastructure implementation, the presence of international agencies
abounds. Nevertheless, one wonders where has all that money gone. Simple calculations show that
the accumulated total of ODA between 1987 and 1997 would have covered not just the cumulated
State budget deficit, but would have been sufficient to “replace” the State current expenditure, that
                                                 
36 When the State issues obligations like Treasury Bills or similar bonds, that is a credit from the private and the
household sector to the State.
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is, to spend at least as much money the Mozambican Government has been spending. Selective
spending would have guaranteed a much higher education, health and infrastructure budget… This
hypothetical exercise is obviously rhetorical, as the natural objection could be that maybe things
would have been worse than they are, had ODA not been brought to Mozambique. Yet, it seems too
much money has been swallowed in the aid machinery and has disappeared.
If economic growth in Mozambique is still unbalanced and not robust, economic policy
certainly carries some responsibility. Yet, as we said above, of the two types of failures it is not
clear whether the Mozambican Government has been guilty more of the first or second type failure.
International agencies and donors also share responsibility. If in Mozambique the State is too big, it
is not just because of a socialist heritage, but also because it has been kept big by the aid machinery.
Yet, everyone accepts the idea that the State is too big. A big State creates economic rents, which
public administrators use to maintain their influence, thus generating abnormal rents.37 This, too, is
where money goes and disappears. It is part of the aid machinery.
Failures of the second type appear to be even more important. One political economy
argument runs that interest groups can oppose and undermine the action of the State: the State fails
inasmuch as it does not gain consensus.38 However, in Mozambique interest groups do not just
oppose, they drop out.. The State does not even get active recognition: the “losers” simply decide
not to participate, by escaping control and operating in the parallel economy.39 This raises the
question of the nature and origin of the State in Mozambique (and in Africa more generally), where
the State was born with the Nation, superimposed on a country that was never a unified national
entity (politically, ethnically and culturally). Besides, the elite in power that led the FRELIMO to
gain independence has been able to build on a success a socialist regime and survive the first
democratic election. Like in other instances in Africa, the duration of a ruling class does not
necessarily correspond to the stability of the political system.
In the parlance of political theory, Mozambique has a consensus regime, that nevertheless
has gotten increasingly rigid, by “occupying” the State with recruitment mechanisms into the public
administration that have favored the formation of a re tier bureaucracy. Additionally, the
bureaucratic apparatus, for lack of alternatives, has created that rentier Sta e hat is seen as a
deadweight to development. Some have argued that this is also due to the negative effects of aid.
States who depend on foreign aid tend not to put too much organizational effort into raising
revenue. Mozambique seems to be a point in case, and if its State budget has always been negative,
it is also because of its low levels of revenues. As a rentier State, it does not have to establish any
                                                 
37 That the State is big, however, is not only measured in terms of percentage of its expenditure over GDP. In
Mozambique, there is almost no initiative (particularly from donors and agencies) that is not carried by means, within or
together with some Ministry or State Office.
38 As Goldsmith puts it, “potential policy-losers tend to mobilize to protect themselves from adverse decisions,
especially if the cost of doing so is lower than the benefit. If they cannot stop a policy from going against them, the
losers will try to cripple the policy as a second line of defense” (1998, p. 17).
39 The whole phenomenon of the informal economy includes survival strategies on a small scale as well as black market
an undeclared activities on a large scale.
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effective reciprocity with its citizens and feel compelled to provide real services in exchange for
taxes. This results in a lack of accountability and responsiveness.40 A rentier State ultimately ends
up being ineffective in imposing its will (and policies) on society.
The role of foreign aid is therefore fundamental in the explanation of Government failures.
Debt and low capacity are certainly a reason for Mozambique to ask for help and for donors to
pledge assistance. But they should not become an excuse for Government neglecting its
responsibilities or for the donors to take over the Government’s role. All measures to improve the
State capacity may turn into their opposite: downsizing personnel can have negative social effects,
raising salaries will have negative budget effects, training staff might be an incentive to leave the
State sector and go into the private sector.
5. Concluding remarks
As we said earlier, it is difficult to look through data and statistical sources, especially in
Mozambique where, after the crash of the colonial administration and the introduction of the
secretive methods of socialist government, statistics were released very parsimoniously and often in
total lack of transparency. In this paper we have tried to explore in depth the available sources on
Mozambican economy, seeking to assess the consistency and solidity of the recently observed
economic growth in Mozambique.
As we have seen, there are reasons to think that economic growth in Mozambique is still
unstable and unsustainable, as it looks uneven across sectors, regions and parts of the economy and
mostly unbalanced. The responsibilities of the Government, the international agencies and the
donors are also clear, and it seems they could work together in helping Mozambique to pull out of
the aid-debt spiral, address the lack of proper Government intervention and take care of the deep
structural imbalances of the economy.
The exercise in data analysis we have presented here should be seen just as a first attempt
to dig into the nature of Mozambican economy, its development and historical background and its
relationship with the evolution of Mozambican society. We know of the importance of the colonial
past, the ethnical and cultural heritage, the diversity of institutional contexts in which the economy
has been developing. As in most African societies, Mozambique is an interesting example of how
different are the patterns of development and transition to a modern market economy. We should
always bear this in mind in judging the performance of an economy which has been travelling at an
incredible speed to adapt at the now dominant western standard with comparably good success.
                                                 
40 These attitudes are also generated by the hierarchical structure of the State bureaucracy, inherited from the colonial
State and reinforced during the socialist regime. In a hierarchical structure, people at the top carry all the responsibility,
while those at the bottom carry too little. The apparatus thus works slowly and ineffectively.
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